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Cross-border transfer of personal information is now more common than ever be-
fore. Indeed, modern technologies like the Internet would simply not work in the ab-
sence of such transfers. At the same time, cross-border transfer of personal informa-
tion is associated with serious privacy risks.
Taking an Australian perspective, this paper examines how the law seeks to bal-
ance these two considerations – the need for transfer, and the need for privacy pro-
tection.
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1. INTRODUCTION
No one would have failed to observe the Internet’s enormous ability to fa-
cilitate communication across geographical borders – in the absence of spe-
cific technology, the ‘net’ does not even recognise the existence of geograph-
ical borders. In sharp contrast, the protection of privacy – a widely recog-
nised fundamental human right1 – is so far wholly dependent on informa-
tion being kept within geographical borders.
* This article draws, and expands, upon a range of the author’s previous work on the regula-
tion of transborder data flows. In particular Svantesson, D. 2007, ‘Protecting privacy on the 
“borderless”  Internet  –  Some thoughts  on extraterritoriality  and transborder  data  flow’, 
Bond Law Review, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 168 – 187, and the author’s submission of December 2008 
to the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet on the proposed UPP 11 have been re-
lied upon.
** Associate Professor, Faculty of Law Bond University,  Gold Coast Queensland 4229 Aus-
tralia,  Ph:  +61  7  5595  1418,  E-mail:  Dan_Svantesson@bond.edu.au,  (http://www.s-
vantesson.org).
1 See primarily the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the  European 
Convention on Human Rights.
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Despite this apparent opposition, there is remarkably little literature and 
cases  dealing  with  privacy  protection  in  the  context  of  transborder  data 
flows on the Internet. This paper examines how Australia is proposing to 
regulate privacy in relation to transborder data flows on the Internet. It also 
discusses the challenges any such regulation necessarily must be able to ad-
dress. However, first, it is necessary to set the scene by saying a few words 
about why such regulation is needed.
2. WHY IS THERE A NEED FOR REGULATION?
Seeing how some countries completely lack privacy regulation, the regula-
tion of the circumstances under which personal information or data may be 
transferred to another country may, at a first glance, seem like a small con-
cern. However, the truth is that it is that very fact – the complete lack of pri-
vacy regulation in many countries around the world – that makes the regu-
lation of transborder data flow crucially important. The truth of the matter 
is that, due to the present primitive and underdeveloped structure for cross-
border protection and enforcement of privacy rights, the transfer of person-
al data to another country represents an abandonment of the protection af-
forded under local law. In other words, where personal information about a 
person in  one country  is  transferred outside  that  country,  the person in 
question often looses any realistic opportunity to control how that informa-
tion is used. The fact that many privacy regulations claim to have extrater-
ritorial effect is of little practical significance due to lacking enforcement.
These serious consequences must be balanced with the Internet’s inher-
ent need for transborder data flows.
3. THE AUSTRALIAN APPROACH
Australia is currently in the middle of a major overhaul of its entire privacy 
regulation. After extensive consultation, the Australian Law Reform Com-
mission presented its  findings regarding privacy regulation in May 2008. 
The 2,694 page document outlined 295 recommendations.  The Australian 
Government is currently working its way through those recommendations. 
At the time of writing, the Government has just released its response to 197 
of the recommendations, accepting 141 of them either in full or in principle 
and accepting another 34 with qualifications. The responses to the remain-
ing 98 recommendations – many of which are crucial for the overall opera-
tion of the regulatory system – will be presented during the second stage of 
the process.
One of the recommendations that has been considered, and that has been 
adopted with amendments, is Recommendation 31-2 which relate to trans-
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border data flow. That recommendation is discussed in detail below, but to 
put that recommendation in its proper context, it is first necessary to exam-
ine how Australia so far has regulated transborder data flow.
4. TRANSBORDER DATA FLOW UNDER THE CURRENT 
PRIVACY REGULATION
On 21 December, 2001, Australia’s  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) was amended so 
as  to  also  regulate  the  private  sector.  The most  important  aspect  of  the 
private sector regulation was the incorporation of ten National Privacy Prin-
ciples (NPPs) that private sector organisations captured by the legislation 
need to follow. NPP 9 addresses transborder data flow:
NPP 9
An organisation in Australia or an external Territory may transfer personal  
information about an individual to someone (other than the organisation or  
the individual) who is in a foreign country only if: 
(a)  the organisation reasonably believes that the recipient of the information  
is  subject to a law, binding scheme or contract which effectively upholds  
principles for fair handling of the information that are substantially similar  
to the National Privacy Principles; or 
(b)  the individual consents to the transfer; or 
(c)  the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between the  
individual and the organisation, or for the implementation of pre-contractu-
al measures taken in response to the individual's request; or 
(d)  the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract  
concluded in the interest of the individual between the organisation and a  
third party; or 
(e)  all of the following apply: 
(i)  the transfer is for the benefit of the individual; 
(ii)  it is impracticable to obtain the consent of the individual to that trans-
fer; 
(iii)  if it were practicable to obtain such consent, the individual would be  
likely to give it; or 
(f)  the organisation has taken reasonable steps to ensure that the informa-
tion which it has transferred will not be held, used or disclosed by the recipi-
ent of the information inconsistently with the National Privacy Principles.
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As I have pointed out elsewhere, this provision is far from perfect and suf-
fers from a range of defects.2
4.1. CONSENT
Under NPP 9, as is the case in relation to several of the NPPs, ‘consent’ is a 
miracle cure for virtually any abuse imaginable.3 As people in general are 
unable to assess the risks associated with a transfer of their personal inform-
ation to another country, consent given is typically not sufficiently informed 
- it would be naive to think that the average consumer ever could fully eval-
uate the legal implications of consenting to their personal information being 
transferred overseas. However, there can be no doubt that much more could 
be done to ensure that data subjects are informed about the risks involved.4
Furthermore, data exporters often make matters worse bundling consent 
for transfer to a third country with consent for other uses.  Such bundled 
consent may be justifiable in some context, but never in relation to overseas 
transfer of personal information. Based on the above, a provision regulating 
transborder  data  flows  should  make  clear  that  consent  is  ineffective  if 
bundled  with  consent  for  other  issues.  Finally,  as  far  as  consent  is  con-
cerned, for consent to be valid,  the data subject must, for example, be in-
formed of:
(a) the country or countries which are the destination(s) of the transfer; 
(b) the intended recipient(s); 
(c) the protective measures that will be taken in relation to the personal in-
formation; 
(d) how the personal information will be used at the destination; and 
(e) whether the personal information will be transferred from the destination  
country (where the personal information will be transferred from the destin-
ation  to  a  third  country,  all  the  information  outlined here  must also  be  
provided in relation to the third country).
2 Svantesson, D. 2007, ‘Protecting privacy on the “borderless” Internet – Some thoughts on 
extraterritoriality and transborder data flow’, Bond Law Review, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 168 – 187.
3 The weakness of the consent requirement is arguably illustrated in the only reported de-
cision of the Privacy Commissioner that deals with the relevant aspect of NPP 9. In  E v  
Money Transfer Services [2006] PrivCmrA 5 the Privacy Commissioner held that the com-
plainant  had  impliedly  consented  to  the  overseas  transfer  of  personal  information. 
However, as is reflected in the very fact that a complaint was made, that implied consent 
may not have been sufficiently informed.
4 Perhaps the very confronting warnings placed on cigarette packs in Australia (see further: 
http://www.smoke-free.ca/warnings/australia-warnings.htm [Accessed 29 November 2009]) 
could serve as an example of how consumers can be informed of the risks involved in al-
lowing their personal information be transferred to another country?
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4.2. REASONABLE BELIEF
There is absolutely no justification for placing emphasis on whether the or-
ganisation responsible for the transfer “reasonably believes” that adequate 
protection would be afforded after the transfer. The reference to a “reason-
able  belief”  creates  a  significant,  and  unnecessary,  uncertainty  without 
adding any benefits. The appropriate approach would be to require the or-
ganisation in question to meet a higher standard of proof by asking them to 
show that show that the recipient of the information is subject to a law or 
binding scheme which effectively upholds principles for fair handling of the 
information that are substantially similar to the National Privacy Principles. 
While, at a first glance, the difference between requiring a ‘reasonable be-
lief’  and  requiring  proof  that  an  adequate  level  of  protection  will  be 
provided may seem minimal, an example may illustrate the enormous prac-
tical differences.
Imagine that company A wishes export data to country X. It contacts a 
privacy consultant (or a law firm) asking the consultant to assess whether a 
recipient in country X is subject to a law or binding scheme which effect-
ively upholds principles for fair handling of the information that are sub-
stantially similar to the National Privacy Principles. The consultant writes a 
statement to the effect  that  such a law or binding scheme is  in  place  in
country X. Imagine further that it turns out that the advice is incorrect, that 
country X lacks adequate privacy protection and that a data subject suffers 
loss due to the fact that company A exported their personal information to 
country X.
If in  this scenario the regulation of transborder data flows merely re-
quires a reasonable belief, company A has surely met the test. Indeed, the 
ALRC Report makes clear that legal advice is sufficient.5 As a consequence, 
the affected data subject can make no claim against company A. This has 
the flow on consequence that, since company A has not suffered any harm 
from the consultant’s poor advice it may not have much of a case to make 
against the consultant.
In contrast, if the regulation of transborder data flows requires company 
A to show that the recipient in country X is in fact subject to a law or bind-
ing scheme which effectively upholds principles for fair handling of the in-
formation that are substantially similar to the National Privacy Principles, 
company A would be unable to do so in our scenario. As a consequence, the 
data subject can take action against  company A, and company A can, in 
5 Australian Law Reform Commission 2008, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and  
Practice, Report No 108, Australian Government, Canberra, para. 1100. 
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turn, make a claim against the consultant for e.g. negligent misrepresenta-
tion or a breach of section 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
As can be seen from this example, the practical consequences are dra-
matically different, and if one allows oneself to be cynical, it is not difficult 
to see why some law firms and privacy consultants, as well as data export-
ing organisations, would be very eager to avoid a change from the inad-
equate ‘reasonable belief’ test.
4.3. SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR
Considering that Australia’s approach does not represent international best 
practice, it could be said to be somewhat arrogant to focus on a “substan-
tially similar” privacy protection instead of acknowledging that there may 
in fact be a better privacy protection scheme in the country to which the 
data is transferred. Consequently,  the regulation of transborder data flows 
must be structured to ensure that a transfer allowed under a  scheme that 
provides  for  “substantially  similar”  protection,  also  is  allowed  under  a 
scheme that provides a more favourable protection for the data subject.
Unlike the approach taken in Europe, the Australian Privacy Commis-
sioner does not identify states with privacy protection meeting the test of a 
“substantially similar” privacy protection outlined in NPP 9(a). The benefits 
of  a  ‘white  list’  are well  documented,  and the   Australian   Government 
should  develop  and publish a list of laws  and  binding schemes in force 
outside Australia that effectively uphold principles for the fair handling of 
personal information that are substantially similar to, or better than, those 
in place in Australia.
4.4. ACCOUNTABILITY
Furthermore,  unlike  both the Asia-Pacific  Economic  Cooperation Privacy 
Framework6 and the Asia-Pacific Privacy Charter7 NPP 9 does not include 
provisions to the effect that the exporter of personal information is account-
able for how the information is treated once it leaves the exporter’s territ-
ory. While, as is discussed above, there are limits to the usefulness of ac-
countability provisions, such a provision would have strengthened NPP 9. 
However, this accountability must necessarily be combined with the type of 
‘border protection’ catered for under the NPP 9.
6 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 2005, APEC Privacy Framework, APEC Secretariat, Singa-
pore, para.  48.
7 Asia-Pacific Privacy Charter Council 2003, Asia-Pacific Privacy Charter, Privacy Principle 12.
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4.5. IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY
Finally, the wisdom of referring to transfer to someone “in a foreign coun-
try” may be questioned. The reference to a foreign country seems to suggest 
that transfer to a location outside Australia, that is not a country, is beyond 
the regulation of NPP 9. This opens the door for transferring personal in-
formation to data processing facilities located in an international space such 
as the high seas, which obviously can be just as harmful as transfer to a for-
eign country. While the idea of data havens in intentional spaces may seem 
far-fetched, attempts have, in fact, already been made at establishing host-
ing facilities beyond the reach of any country’s jurisdiction.8 Further, Google 
is pursuing the idea of offshore data storage centres.9 Consequently, the risk 
is not as remote as might first be though.
5. TRANSBORDER DATA FLOW UNDER
THE PROPOSED PRIVACY REGULATION
While the Government is yet to express this recommendation in the form of 
legislation text, it has made clear its intention to follow all the major aspects 
of the ALRC’s recommendation regarding transborder data flows. Combin-
ing the ALRC’s proposal with the comments made in the Government’s re-
sponse, Unified Privacy Principle 11 (UPP 11) is likely to look something 
like this:
UPP 11
11.1 If an agency or organisation in Australia or an external territory trans-
fers personal information about an individual to a recipient (other than the  
agency, organisation or the individual) who is outside Australia and an ex-
ternal territory, the agency or organisation remains accountable for that per-
sonal information, unless the:
(a) agency or organisation reasonably believes that the recipient of the in-
formation is subject to a law or binding scheme which effectively upholds  
privacy protections that are substantially similar to these principles;
(b) individual consents to the transfer, after being expressly advised that the  
consequence of providing consent is that the agency or organisation will no  
8 Refer e.g. to the now failed data haven, HavenCo, located on an abandoned anti-aircraft 
platform.   Garfinkel,  S. 2000, ‘Welcome to Sealand.  Now Bugger Off’,  Wired,  issue 8.07, 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.07/haven.html [Accessed 27 November 2009].
9 Miller,  R.  2008,  ‘Google  Planning  Offshore  Data  Barges’,  Data  Centre  Knowledge, 
http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2008/09/06/google-planning-offshore-data-
barges/ [Accessed 29 November 2009]. See further: Clidaras, J., Stiver, D. W. & Hamburgen, 
W.  2008,  Water  Based  Data  Center,  US  Patent  Application  20080209234, 
http://appft1.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PG01&p=1&u=
%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.html&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=%2220080209234%22.PGNR.&
OS=DN/20080209234&RS=DN/20080209234 [Accessed 29 November 2009]. 
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longer be accountable for the individual’s personal information once trans-
ferred; or
(c)  agency  or  organisation  is  required or  authorised  by or  under  law to  
transfer the personal information; 
(d) the agency or organisation reasonably believes that the disclosure is ne-
cessary to lessen or prevent a serious threat to:
(i)  an individual’s life, health or safety; or
(ii)  public health or public safety;
where in the circumstances, it is unreasonable or impracticable to seek the  
individual’s consent;
(e) the agency or organisation has reason to suspect that unlawful activity  
or serious misconduct has been, is being or may be engaged in, and the dis-
closure of the personal information is a necessary part of its own investiga-
tion of the matter or in reporting its concerns to relevant persons or author-
ities; or
(f) the agency or organisation reasonably believes that the disclosure is ne-
cessary for the prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution or punish-
ment of criminal offences, breaches of a law imposing a penalty or sanction  
or breaches of a prescribed law.
First of all it is interesting to observe that UPP is very different to all the oth-
er UPPs – it is “unbreakable”. While data processor may act in a manner 
that violates any of the other UPPs, it is simply impossible for a data pro-
cessor to violate UPP 11. If transfer tales place outside the wide scope of the 
types of transfer anticipated in sub-sections a-f, the data processor will be 
accountable  for  the  actions  of  the  receiver.  This  fundamental  difference 
between UPP 11 and the other UPPs has not been explored, nor has it been 
explained, by either the ALRC or the Australian Government.  
The change from NPP 9 to UPP 11 carries with it a terminology change. 
Instead of referring to the area as transborder data flows, it is now referred 
to as cross-border data flows. More importantly, the new approach to regu-
lating this area, whatever you call it, will involve the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner publishing a list of laws and binding schemes that meet the 
test  of  being  providing  privacy  protection  substantially  similar  to  the 
UPPs.10 Further, the new wording avoids the risk of exports to data havens 
in international spaces being exempt. Another positive step is taken in that 
10 Australian Government 2009,  First Stage  Government Response to the ALRC Report 108, 
Australian  Government,  Canberra,  p.  79,  http://www.pmc.gov.au/privacy/alrc_docs/
stage1_aus_govt_response.doc [Accessed 29 November 2009].
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the Privacy Act will be amended to clarify that, if an organisation transfers 
personal information to a related body corporate outside Australia or an ex-
ternal territory, the transfer will be subject to the ‘Cross-border Data Flows’ 
principle.11
Unfortunately, however, the proposed UPP 11 suffers from several of the 
same problems that privacy advocates have pointed to in NPP 9 for years. 
For example, the issue of focusing on “reasonable belief” and the issue of fo-
cusing on “substantially similar” protection remain the same. Further, while 
the ALRC sought to improve the consent requirement, for example, by stat-
ing that: “[a]ny bundled consent obtained should allow the individual  to 
decide whether to consent to the cross-border transfer of their personal in-
formation”,12 it is not immediately clear how the issue of bundled consent 
will be dealt with on a practical level.13 
5.1. OVERRELIANCE ON ACCOUNTABILITY
The most confronting issue in UPP 11 is its naive overreliance on accountab-
ility. Currently, UPP 11 requires the transfer to be based on one of a number 
of approved grounds, and where the transfer does not fall within either of 
those broad grounds, the agency or organisation responsible for the transfer 
will be accountable for how the personal information is treated by the recip-
ient. This approach is seriously flawed. Where a transfer of personal inform-
ation has  no  support  in  any of the  wide  circumstances  outlined  in  UPP 
11(a)-(f), there can be no justification for the transfer, even if some level of 
accountability  applies  to  the  agency or organisation  responsible  for  the 
transfer. Such a transfer should quite simply not be allowed. In the change 
from NPP 9, to UPP 11, the Australian Government has gone from a weak 
regime aimed at preventing harm, to an unrealistic and naive hope of cor-
recting harm after it occurs.
Several leading privacy experts have pointed to the flaws in the overreli-
ance  on  ‘accountability’.  For  example,  Professor  Greenleaf  has  observed 
that:
11 Australian  Government  2009,  First  Stage  Government  Response  to  the  ALRC  Report  108,  
Australian  Government,  Canberra,  p.  79,   http://www.pmc.gov.au/privacy/alrc_docs/
stage1_aus_govt_response.doc [Accessed 29 November 2009].
12 Australian Law Reform Commission 2008, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and  
Practice, Report No 108, Australian Government, Canberra, para. 1103.
13 For a more detailed discussion of the consent issues, see Australian Law Reform Commis-
sion 2008, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report No 108, Australi-
an Government, Canberra, Chapter 19. See also,  Australian Government 2009,  First Stage  
Government  Response  to  the  ALRC  Report  108,  Australian  Government,  Canberra,  p.  38,
http://www.pmc.gov.au/privacy/alrc_docs/stage1_aus_govt_response.doc  [Accessed  29 
November 2009]. 
10 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 4:1
The supposed virtue of the new approach is that although your personal in-
formation can be  exported to  anywhere  that  does not  have ‘substantially  
similar’ privacy protections to Australia, if the exporter does so then theoret-
ically they 'remain accountable' for overseas misuses of your personal in-
formation. ‘Theoretical’ is the key word, because the onus of proof (on the  
civil balance of probabilities) of a specific breach of a privacy principles by a  
specific overseas party still rests with you; as does the requirement to prove  
that the party in breach received the information directly or indirectly (but  
foreseeably) from the Australian exporting party; as does the requirement to  
prove that there was a causal connection between that breach and damage to  
you.  And of course the country from which the damage to you emanated  
might not be the same as the country to which the data was exported, but  
you are the one who has to join the dots. 
How do you satisfy these requirements of proof when your data has travelled  
to Nigeria, India, Russia, the USA or ‘all of the above’, and you may not  
even know? Might it be dangerous to try? Might it be expensive?
The so-called 'accountability' principle is a sham: the absence of any real  
likelihood of accountability is what is rotten at the core of the ALRC and  
Rudd Government approach.14
In addition, commenting on the ALRC proposal, Connolly concluded that 
“[o]verall, the proposed UPP 11 is the weakest possible implementation of 
the accountability principle, and will do little to increase confidence in this 
new approach to privacy protection.”15
The accountability approach should work as an added layer of protec-
tion – not as an alternative. Suggestions that accountability can replace the 
limitations to when transfer can take place, or that the limitations to when 
transfer can take place makes accountability unnecessary are misguided. To 
use an analogy, the fact that we have torts law does not mean we do not 
need traffic rules, and the fact that we have traffic rules does not mean we 
do not need torts law. Similarly, we need both limitations on when transfer 
can take place, and accountability rules for when transfer takes place. 
Furthermore, any inclusion of an accountability scheme makes necessary 
rules governing the burden of proof. As pointed out above, the data subject 
will typically always be in a weak position in seeking to prove a breach – 
14 Greenleaf,  G.  2009,  ‘Rudd Government abandons border  security  of  privacy’,  Australian 
Policy  Online,  http://www.apo.org.au/commentary/rudd-government-abandons-border-se-
curity-privacy [Accessed 29 November 2009].
15 Connolly, C. 2008,  ‘Weak protection for offshore data – the ALRC recommendations for 
Cross Border Transfers’,  Galexia, http://www.galexia.com/public/research/articles/research_ 
articles-art54.html [Accessed 28 November 2009].
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the data subject will experience the damages flowing from the breach, but 
may not be in a position to know where or how the breach occurred. This is 
particularly so, where the breach occurs overseas. Based on the above, it is 
submitted that where it is reasonable to assume that damages suffered by a 
data subject are due to a breach of the UPPs, the party held accountable un-
der UPP 11 bears the burden of proving that no breach has occurred.
The appropriate starting point for UPP 11 is to outline the circumstances 
under which  transfer  is  allowed.  In doing so,  the three categories  estab-
lished in the version of UPP 11 found in ALRC’s Report 108 are useful (al-
though some changes are required in the details).  In addition to this,  the 
agency or organisation responsible for the transfer should be accountable 
for  the  recipient’s  treatment  of  the  personal  information.  In  light  of  the 
above, it is submitted that UPP 11 ought to outline the circumstances under 
which  transfer  is  allowed,  as  well  as  provide  for  accountability  by  the 
agency or organisation responsible for the transfer.
Despite  introducing  an  accountability  concept,  UPP  11  still  lacks  ad-
equate  post-transfer  accountability.  That  is  because  where  export  takes 
place within the very wide exceptions outlined in sub-sections a-f, the ac-
countability requirement does not apply.
5.2. INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS
On top of everything,  the Government’s  response  to  the ALRC’s  recom-
mendations  manages to  introduce an addition  concern.  The Government 
wants to add a sub-section to the effect that transfer can take place for the 
purpose of an internal investigation.
 It is worrying to see that an organisation will be allowed to export per-
sonal  information  about  Australian’s  based  on  that  organisation  having 
”reason to suspect” that unlawful activity or serious misconduct has been, 
or is being, or even may be, engaged in. It is not difficult to see how such a 
provision, for example, can be used to export personal data about Australi-
ans suspected of having played some role in illegal file sharing. While this 
paper does not aim to discuss the conflict between legitimate privacy con-
cerns on the one hand, and copyright owners’ legal right to find out who in-
fringes their copy right on the other hand, it is submitted that allowing ex-
port as proposed will seriously undermine Australians’ legitimate privacy 
expectations.
5.3. A BIT PREMATURE?
Finally, even leaving aside all the issues outlined here that need to be ad-
dressed for a successful UPP 11 to be put into place, it must be remembered 
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that the Australian Government is still to address several key aspects of the 
ALRC’s  recommendations  in  its  second-stage  report.  Consequently,  it  is 
somewhat premature to finalise the structure for a UPP 11 – without know-
ing the exact scope within which UPP 11 is to operate,16 it is simply not pos-
sible to finalise a text for UPP 11.
6. SOME OTHER KEY CHALLENGES
Any approach to the regulation of privacy in relation to transborder data 
flows on the Internet will be faced with severe challenges. Here, I discuss 
some of the key challenges such regulation must cope with.
6.1. CROSS-BORDER E-MAILS17
One fundamental problem of transborder data transfers arises in the context 
of e-mails containing personal information, being sent by, or to, e-mailing 
systems hosted overseas. This problem is augmented by the fact that, the 
laws of the place where the mail system server is located may require that 
the authorities have access to the e-mails and thereby the personal informa-
tion.
Imagine,  for  example,  a  situation  where  an  Australian  doctor  emails 
some test results to an Australian patient. Imagine further that the patient is 
using Microsoft’s Hotmail system. While the e-mail is sent from one Aus-
tralian party to another, the e-mail including the sensitive personal informa-
tion it contains, may be stored on a server overseas. Has the Australian doc-
tor in this situation transferred personal information to someone in a for-
eign  country?  The  answer  would  seem to  be  yes,  as  the  information  is 
placed on a server located in a foreign country. The next question is then 
whether the doctor has acted in violation of the applicable privacy legisla-
tion in doing so? In answering this latter question, one could point to the 
fact that the patient voluntarily has chosen the e-mail system it uses which 
could be seen as an indication of consent to the transfer. However, first of 
all, it may be likely that the patient was unable to properly appreciate the 
consequences of doing so, and thus we can question whether such consent 
was  informed.  To  make such  consent  informed,  the  organisation  should 
take steps to ensure that the patient fully appreciates the consequences of 
using  e-mail  for  the  communication.  Indeed,  in  many  situations,  e-mail 
simply is not a suitable form of communication due to its inherent open-
ness. Further, should the scenario be slightly different so that it involved 
16 It is, for example, not clear whether the current “small business” exemption will be kept.
17 Parts of this sections draws upon: Svantesson, D. 2007, ‘Protecting privacy on the “border-
less” Internet – Some thoughts on extraterritoriality and transborder data flow’, Bond Law 
Review, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 168 – 187.
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one doctor e-mailing the test  results to another Australian doctor (an act 
that would be regulated by the rules on disclosure), the patient may have 
consented to the disclosure but not to the transfer to another country.
The problem outlined above does not have a simple solution. One pos-
sibility would be to make an assessment of the reasonableness of the organ-
isation’s actions in arguably exporting the personal information. Both the 
advantages and disadvantages of such an approach would flow from its 
flexibility. While the approach would be flexible enough to protect organ-
isations acting reasonably in a wide range of circumstances, it would also be 
uncertain  enough to  make it  virtually  impossible  for  a  data  exporter  to 
know whether it has acted in violation of the applicable privacy law. The 
only way to make this  approach work would be by providing extensive 
guidelines.
Another possibility is simply to view such an act as involving transfer to 
a third country. It would then be for the organisations regulated by the Act 
to make sure that they avoid such situations by using an e-mail system that 
does not involve the e-mails being stored on a server located in a foreign 
country. This is, however, likely to incur some costs for the organisations.
6.2. WEB PUBLICATIONS AND WEB 2.0
The Swedish Lindqvist case is an interesting example of the Internet-related 
issues that a provision dealing with cross-border data must be able to ad-
dress. In that case, a woman – Bodil Lindqvist – who had taken a computer 
course uploaded a website on which she made available personal informa-
tion about herself and her husband. The website also included personal in-
formation relating to a number of her colleagues in the church community 
she  worked for.  The information provided included matters such  as full 
names, work duties, hobbies, family circumstances and phone numbers. She 
also discussed a foot injury suffered by one of the colleagues.
The website,  which was published without  the permission of her col-
leagues,  generated  some  complaints  and  the  matter  ended  up  in  court. 
While the legal proceedings related to a range of matter, such as whether 
Lindqvist’s conduct amounted to “the processing of personal data wholly or 
partly by automatic means” for the purpose of the EU privacy directive18, 
the interesting  part  for  this  paper  is  that  the Court  was asked to assess 
whether Lindqvist’s conduct meant she had transferred the data in question 
to a third country. Göta hovrätt stayed the proceedings and referred seven 
18 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data (OJ 1995 L 281, p. 31). 
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questions to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Most interestingly, ques-
tion five asked the ECJ to address the ‘transfer’ issue:
[Directive 95/46] prohibits the transfer of personal data to third countries in  
certain cases. If a person in Sweden uses a computer to load personal data  
onto a home page stored on a server in Sweden - with the result that person-
al data become accessible to people in third countries - does that constitute a  
transfer  of  data  to  a  third country within the  meaning of  the  directive?  
Would the answer be the same even if,  as far as known, no one from the  
third country had in fact accessed the data or if the server in question was  
actually physically in a third country?19
The Court answered this question in the negative.20 However, it is interest-
ing to examine how the Court reached that conclusion. 
Having noted that “it is necessary to take account both of the technical 
nature of the operations thus carried out and of the purpose and structure 
of Chapter IV of that directive where Article 25 appears”,21 the Court made 
some observations as to the relevant technical setup:
It appears from the court file that, in order to obtain the information appear-
ing on the internet pages on which Mrs Lindqvist had included information  
about her colleagues, an internet user would not only have to connect to the  
internet but also personally carry out the necessary actions to consult those  
pages. In other words, Mrs Lindqvist's internet pages did not contain the  
technical means to send that information automatically to people who did  
not intentionally seek access to those pages.
It follows that, in circumstances such as those in the case in the main pro-
ceedings, personal data which appear on the computer of a person in a third  
country, coming from a person who has loaded them onto an internet site,  
were not directly transferred between those two people but through the com-
puter infrastructure of the hosting provider where the page is stored.22
19 Case C-101/01 Criminal Proceedings against Bodil Lindvist, 6 November 2003, European Court 
of Justice, para. 18,  http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/gettext.pl?lang=en&num=79968893
C19010101&doc=T&ouvert=T&seance=ARRET [Accessed 24 November 2009].
20 Case C-101/01 Criminal Proceedings against Bodil Lindvist, 6 November 2003, European Court 
of  Justice, http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/gettext.pl?lang=en&num=79968893C190101
01&doc=T&ouvert=T&seance=ARRET [Accessed 24 November 2009].
21 Case C-101/01 Criminal Proceedings against Bodil Lindvist, 6 November 2003, European Court 
of Justice, para. 57,  http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/gettext.pl?lang=en&num=79968893
C19010101&doc=T&ouvert=T&seance=ARRET [Accessed 24 November 2009].
22 Case C-101/01 Criminal Proceedings against Bodil Lindvist, 6 November 2003, European Court 
of Justice, paras. 60-61, http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/gettext.pl?lang=en&num=799688
93C19010101&doc=T&ouvert=T&seance=ARRET [Accessed 24 November 2009].
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While it is true that Lindqvist could not transfer the content of her website 
to an Internet user that was not connected to the Internet at the time, or who 
did not wish to take the steps necessary to visit her website, that is no differ-
ent to the fact that a TV station cannot provide TV programs to somebody 
who does not turn on their TV, or who does not chose the TV station’s par-
ticular channel. Consequently, the Court’s justification of their approach, by 
reference to the relevant technology, is weak indeed.   
The Court then turned to the purpose of the relevant part of the Directive:
Chapter IV of Directive 95/46 contains no provision concerning use of the  
internet. In particular, it does not lay down criteria for deciding whether op-
erations carried out by hosting providers should be deemed to occur in the  
place of establishment of the service or at its business address or in the place  
where the computer or computers constituting the service's infrastructure  
are located.
Given, first, the state of development of the internet at the time Directive  
95/46 was drawn up and, second, the absence, in Chapter IV, of criteria ap-
plicable to use of the internet, one cannot presume that the Community le-
gislature intended the expression ‘transfer [of data] to a third country’ to  
cover the loading, by an individual in Mrs Lindqvist's position, of data onto  
an internet page, even if those data are thereby made accessible to persons in  
third countries with the technical means to access them.23
This conclusion is not justified. The fact that the Directive does not make 
specific  mention of the Internet,  suggests that it  is  drafted in technology 
neutral  language.  Where  that  is  the  case,  it  cannot  be  assumed  that  the 
drafters did not intend the Directive to apply to Internet related activities 
such as in the  Lindqvist case. Rather, the technology neutral language sug-
gests that the application of the Directive should not be dependent on the 
technology in  question.  The Courts conclusion is  perhaps even more ex-
traordinary when one considers that the Internet was in place (be as it may 
on a different scale) at the time the Directive was drafted. Consequently, 
had the drafters wanted to exclude Internet activities, they would presum-
ably have made that clear.
The third justification the Court presented for their conclusion is more 
interesting:
23 Case C-101/01 Criminal Proceedings against Bodil Lindvist, 6 November 2003, European Court 
of  Justice,  paras.  67-68, http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/gettext.pl?lang=en&num=
79968893C19010101&doc=T&ouvert=T&seance=ARRET [Accessed 24 November 2009].
16 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 4:1
If Article 25 of Directive 95/46 were interpreted to mean that there is ‘trans-
fer [of data] to a third country’ every time that personal data are loaded onto  
an internet page, that transfer would necessarily be a transfer to all the third  
countries where there are the technical means needed to access the internet.  
The special regime provided for by Chapter IV of the directive would thus  
necessarily become a regime of general application, as regards operations on  
the internet. Thus, if the Commission found, pursuant to Article 25(4) of  
Directive 95/46, that even one third country did not ensure adequate protec-
tion, the Member States would be obliged to prevent any personal data being  
placed on the internet.24 
This argument is much harder, if not impossible, to dismiss, and it shows a 
type of thinking that is far too rare amongst courts having to address legal 
issues associated with rapidly developing technologies.  Instead of merely 
applying the law to the situation at hand, the Court made an assessment of 
the likely  consequences  of  finding that  Lindqvist’s  conduct  amounted to 
transfer. In other words, while it may be difficult to argue that Lindqvist’s 
conduct did not amount to a transfer, the consequences of reaching such a 
finding would be devastating for the technology in question – a reasonable-
ness test was applied.
In this context, it is interesting to note the ALRC’s statement that:
Generally, if personal information is stored in Australia, but is accessed or  
viewed outside Australia, it should be considered to have been transferred. If  
personal information is routed and temporarily stored outside Australia, but  
is not accessed, it should not fall within the purview of the ‘Cross-border  
Data Flows’ principle. If it is accessed, however, it should be subject to the  
principle.25
In light  of  this  remark,  it  is  possible  that  a  situation such  as that  in  the 
Lindqvist case would have been viewed as amounting to transfer under Aus-
tralian law.
If the situation is complicated in the context of publication of personal 
information on websites, it gets even worse if we consider more recent tech-
nologies. Imagine, for example, that instead of placing the relevant informa-
tion on a website, Bodil Lindqvist would have placed the same information 
on her Facebook site. Imagine further that she was aware that some of her 
24 Case C-101/01 Criminal Proceedings against Bodil Lindvist, 6 November 2003, European Court 
of  Justice,  para.  69,  http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/gettext.pl?lang=en&num=
79968893C19010101&doc=T&ouvert=T&seance=ARRET [Accessed 24 November 2009].
25 Australian Law Reform Commission 2008, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and  
Practice, Report No 108, Australian Government, Canberra, paras. 1116-1117.
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Facebook “friends” were located in countries outside the European Union. 
In such a situation, it would be much easier to argue that she intentionally 
transferred  the  data  to  another  country.  However,  bearing  in  mind  the 
nature of Facebook, the consequences of finding the conduct to amount to 
“transfer” would be much the same as finding that Bodil  Linqvist  trans-
ferred the data to another country by placing it on her website – it would 
mean that one simply could not place personal information relating to an-
other person on one’s Facebook site in the event that one has “friends” in 
another country.
6.3. CLOUD COMPUTING26
Cloud computing is a vague term typically used to refer to a technical ar-
rangement under which users store their data on remote servers under the 
control of other parties, and rely on software applications stored and per-
haps executed elsewhere, rather than on their own computers.  The term en-
compasses a variety of services, which are variously of long standing (in-
cluding email27), long-promised (including ‘software as a service’), and rel-
atively new.
There are many potential benefits with such arrangements. For example:
• The user can access the same set of applications, and the same data, 
regardless of location, and regardless of which hardware they use 
(such as computers, PDAs and mobile phones, including both their 
own hardware and devices borrowed from other individuals and 
organisations); 
• Several users can access and share the same applications and data 
which assists in collaborative work;
• Backup and recovery is delegated to a service-provider, which pre-
sumably enhances its reliability;
• Licensing of software and third-party data can be simplified; and
• Complex tasks can be performed by using less powerful devices by 
depending on more powerful remote servers. 
At the same time, cloud computing is  associated with severe risks in the 
areas of service and data integrity, consumer rights, security and privacy. 
26 Parts of this sections draws upon: a policy statement drafted for, and together with other 
members of, the Australian Privacy Foundation 2009, APF Policy Statement re Cloud Comput-
ing http://www.privacy.org.au/Papers/CloudComp-0911.html [Accessed 29 November 2009].
27 In that sense, a discussion of the problems associated with cloud computing has already 
taken place in the discussion of hotmail above. However, as the e-mail situation could arise 
outside the scope of cloud computing, and as cloud computing issues go beyond the situ-
ation discussed, I have chosen to discuss cloud computing as a separate issue.
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Most importantly,  for  the discussion  in  this  paper,  cloud computing  fits 
very uneasily with the idea of transborder data flow regulation. In fact, in 
the typical cloud computing situation, the location of the data is irrelevant 
and is often unknown to the user of the cloud-computing service, and pos-
sibly even to the supplier. In light of that, it seems unlikely that the user 
could be adequately informed to give valid consent to the transfer.
7. RECOMMENDATION
As already noted, it is not possible to draft UPP 11 until a range of matters, 
such as the exact scope of the  Privacy Act, has been established. However, 
having taken account of the above, I propose that Australia adopts a provi-
sion governing cross-border data, along the following lines:
11.1 An agency or organisation28 shall not transfer personal information to  
a recipient (other than the agency, organisation or the data subject) who is  
outside Australia and an external territory unless:
(a) the recipient of the information is subject to a law, binding scheme or  
contract which effectively upholds privacy protections that are substantially  
similar to, or more favourable to the data subject than, this Act and which  
are enforceable by the data subject;
(b) the data subject consents to the transfer, after being expressly advised of  
the country or countries which are the destination(s) of the transfer, the in-
tended recipient(s), the protective measures that will be taken in relation to  
the personal information, how the personal information will be used at the  
destination, and whether the personal information will be transferred from 
the destination country (where the personal information will be transferred  
from the destination to a third country, all  the information outlined here  
must also be provided in relation to the third country); or
(c) the agency or organisation is required by Australian law to transfer the  
personal information to the recipient.
11.2 Where an agency or organisation transfers personal information to a  
recipient (other than the agency, organisation or the data subject) who is  
outside Australia and an external territory, it remains strictly liable for how  
28 Unlike the other UPPs, UPP 11 includes a jurisdictional limitation in that it is limited to the 
conduct of an agency or organisation “in Australia or an external territory”. First, from a 
structural perspective, the jurisdictional scope of the UPPs ought to be uniform. There is no 
reason to have different standards for different UPPs. Indeed, such differences complicate 
the application of the UPPs in an unnecessary manner. Second, and more seriously, limiting 
UPP 11 to agencies and organisations in Australia or the  external territories opens the 
door for agencies and organisations, based  overseas, transferring overseas data without 
any regard for the protection that UPP 11 ought to provide. Consequently, it I have opted to 
remove the limitation to an agencies and organisations “in Australia or an external territ-
ory”.
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the personal information is used by the recipient, unless the transfer falls  
within 11.1(c).
11.3  After  appropriate  consultation,  the  Government  shall  produce  and 
maintain a list of jurisdictions deemed to have laws and/or binding schemes  
that satisfy the requirement of 11.1(a).
11.4  After  appropriate  consultation,  the  Government  shall  produce  and 
maintain a list of standard clauses that must be included in contracts of the  
type envisaged in 11.1(a). 
11.5 Consent as described in 11.1(b) must not be bundled.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Some commentators view the European Court of Justice’s decision in the 
Lindqvist case as “draconian and abusive”29 and have pointed to that case as 
an  illustration  that  US  lawmakers  must  steer  clear  of  EU-style  “heavy-
handed centralized legislation”.30 They suggest that the better approach is to 
focus on whether any damage has been caused:  “An action such as this 
[i.e. the  Lindqvist  case]  would  be  highly  unlikely  in  the  United  States 
without at least the perception of harm by some party. In the United States, 
the party perceiving harm would seek to remedy that harm, generally as an 
individual with an equity or tort claim.”31
Not  only  does  this  illuminate  a  deep-seated  difference  in  attitude 
between Europe and the United States, it also brings attention to a funda-
mental choice facing countries like Australia that are structuring or re-struc-
turing their privacy regulation. On the one hand there is  the option of a 
European-style regulation aimed at preventing harm, and on the other hand 
there is the option of a US-style regulation mainly aimed at compensating 
where harm occurs.
I think a comparison with traffic regulation can be illustrative also in this 
high-level  context.  We have rules  about  how fast  cars can travel  on our 
roads. While most people would have felt frustration on some occasion in 
having to drive slower than the conditions may warrant, we realise that the 
speed rules are in place to avoid harm. We recognise that it is better to try to 
29 Garcia, F. J. 2005,  ‘Bodil Lidnqvist: A Swedish Churchgoer’s Violation of the European Uni-
on’s Data Protection Directive Should Be a Warning to U.S. Legislators’, Fordham Intellectual  
Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal, vol. XV, p. 1233.
30 Garcia, F. J. 2005, ‘Bodil Lidnqvist: A Swedish Churchgoer’s Violation of the European Uni-
on’s Data Protection Directive Should Be a Warning to U.S. Legislators’, Fordham Intellectual  
Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal, vol. XV, p. 1233.
31 Garcia, F. J. 2005,  ‘Bodil Lidnqvist: A Swedish Churchgoer’s Violation of the European Uni-
on’s Data Protection Directive Should Be a Warning to U.S. Legislators’, Fordham Intellectual  
Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal,  vol. XV, p. 1229.
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avoid traffic-related harm being suffered, than it is to compensate for such 
harm.  In  light  of  that,  we conclude  that  a  person may be  penalised  for 
speeding even where the speeding does not cause any harm – speeding is 
the regulated activity, not just the causing of harm through speeding. 
Applying this thinking to privacy regulation, we may have to accept that 
privacy laws may feel restrictive in some cases, but they are there to avoid 
harm being suffered through misuse of our personal information. Thus, we 
need to make sure that a violation of our privacy rights is taken seriously 
even where we cannot point to any specific harm being suffered as a con-
sequence of that violation.
Having said that, as I have pointed out above, the appropriate way for-
ward, at least as far as cross-border data flows are concerned, is to combine 
the EU-style focus on preventative regulation (through border control) with 
the US-style focus on compensation for harm (through the application of the 
accountability principle).
